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HABITAT MODIFICATION AND ESA TAKINGS UNDER
BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAPTER OF
COMMUNITIES FOR A GREAT OREGON
I. INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) 1 protects species
in danger of extinction through a comprehensive ecosystem preser-
vation program.2 The ESA is indisputably the most powerful and
sweeping wildlife legislation to date.3 Its regulatory provisions en-
compass a wide variety of public and private land uses. 4 Potential
liability under ESA is therefore quite extensive. 5 One of ESA's most
controversial regulations is the section 9 taking provision.6 Section
9 prohibits the taking of an endangered species by any person. 7 An
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994), as amended by 16 U.S.CA. §§ 1531-44
(West Supp. 1995)). ESA's primary goals are: (1) to extend taking liability to pri-
vate property; (2) to protect species before they become threatened or endan-
gered; and (3) to establish an example of species protection and preservation for
the world. Davina Kari Kaile, Evolution of Wildlife Legislation in the United States: An
Analysis of the Legal Efforts to Protect Endangered Species and the Prospects for the Future, 5
GEO. INT'L ENWVL. L. Rlv. 441, 456 (1993).
2. Paul D. Ort, What Does it Take to Take and What Does it Take to Jeopardize? A
Comparative Analysis of the Standards Embodied in Sections 7 and 9 of the Endangered
Species Act, 7 TUL. EN'rvL. LJ. 197, 199 (1993).
3. Federico Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against Takings in Section
9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a Powerful Species Preserva-
tion Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 109 (1991). The expansive liability provision of ESA
is particularly powerful because it applies to all persons on either public or private
land. Id. at 111.
4. Some of the key regulatory provisions of ESA should be briefly noted. ESA
§ 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1532 defines the statutory terms. ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 re-
quires the Secretary of the Interior to list endangered and threatened species, and
authorizes the Secretary to promulgate regulations. ESA § 5, 16 U.S.C. § 1534 per-
mits the federal government to acquire private land to preserve endangered and
threatened species. ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 prohibits any activity by a federal
agency, including habitat modification or degradation and the issuance of licenses
and permits, that would jeopardize the critical habitat of an endangered species.
ESA § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 lists acts that are prohibited under the statute. ESA § 10,
16 U.S.C. § 1539 creates a permit system that allows incidental takings of endan-
gered and threatened species otherwise prohibited under § 9.
5. As a result of its sweeping regulatory power, ESA's taking prohibition poses
a huge legal threat to both private citizens and government agencies. Robert L.
Fischman, Endangered Species Conservation: What Should We Expect of Federal Agencies?,
13 PuB. LAND L. Rv. 1, 5 (1992).
6. ESA § 9(a) (1) (B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B). This provision of ESA makes
it unlawful for any person to "take" any endangered species of fish or wildlife
within the United States or the territorial seas of the United States. Id.
7. ESA defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
(481)
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ESA taking includes "harm" to any endangered or threatened spe-
cies; however, ESA fails to define this vague term." ESA instead au-
thorizes the Secretary of the Interior, through the Director of the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), to promulgate
regulations that further define the terms specified in ESA. 9
This Note examines the challenge to the USFWS regulation
defining "harm"n 0 under the section 9 taking provision of ESA as
addressed in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon (Sweet Home IV).I l Part II establishes trends of judicial inter-
pretation of ESA's taking prohibition and methods of statutory con-
struction. The factual background and complex procedural history
of Sweet Home IV is then discussed in Part III. Part IV provides a
narrative analysis of the court's rationale. Part V analyzes the con-
sistency of the holding in light of section 9 case law, the propriety of
using various methods of statutory interpretation, and the standard
of review. Finally, Part VI addresses the impact of Sweet Home IVon
land use restrictions and deference to agency discretion.
II. TRENDS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. Construction of the Section 9 Taking Provision
The body of case law interpreting ESA's section 9 taking prohi-
bition is at best muddled.1 2 The holdings in these section 9 cases,
based on diverse and specific fact patterns, reflect ad hoc decision
making, and therefore represent no clear authority on the subject
of takings.' 3 The USFWS definition of "harm," prohibited under
section 9, includes significant habitat modifications. 14 Conse-
quently, most jurisdictions recognize that at least some forms of sig-
nificant habitat modification could be considered "harmful" to
trap, capture or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." ESA
§ 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
8. Id.
9. Pursuant to ESA § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d), the Secretary of the Interior
promulgated 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) which defines "harm" under the § 9 taking
provision.
10. "Harm" is defined as "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such
an act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actu-
ally kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
11. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon
(Sweet Home M1), 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
12. Courts disagree about the degree of habitat modification necessary to
constitute a taking under § 9. For a further discussion ofjudicial interpretation of
the taking provision, see infra notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
13. See Cheever, supra note 3, at 162.
14. For the definition of "harm," see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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threatened or endangered species, and are therefore, prohibited
under ESA. 15
Sierra Club v. Froehike16 represents one of the earliest interpreta-
tions of ESA's taking prohibition. In Froehlke, the Eighth Circuit
rejected a claim that habitat modifications resulting from the con-
struction of a reservoir were significant enough to constitute "har-
assment" of bats.17 The United States Supreme Court expanded
this restrictive interpretation of takings in Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Hill.18 The Court, in Hill, recognized that the habitat modifica-
tions involved in the construction and operation of a dam could
not be accomplished without "harming" the native snail darter.' 9
Despite this decision, district courts continued to narrowly construe
the taking provision by requiring that the habitat modification pose
an immediate threat to the endangered species.20
The trend of narrow interpretation of the section 9 taking pro-
hibition ended in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Re-
sources (Palila ) .21 In Palila I, the district court held that the habitat
15. For a discussion of cases holding that significant habitat modification con-
stituted an ESA taking, see infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
16. 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
17. Id. at 1304. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the construction of the Mer-
amec Park Lake Dam, arguing that the habitat modifications involved in the pro-
ject constituted a taking of the Indiana bat under § 9 of ESA. Id. at 1291. The
Eighth Circuit held that although the project would necessarily involve flooding
caves in which the bats currently lived, these habitat modifications were not signifi-
cant enough to constitute "harassment" or "harm" to the bats. Id. at 1304. The
court also stressed that ESA must have a "reasonable construction." Id. The court
attempted to balance the benefits of the project and the importance of conserva-
tion in holding that habitat modifications of this degree were not sufficient to
warrant the injunction of a project of this magnitude. Id. at 1305.
18. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
19. Id. at 184 n.30. In Hill the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the construction of
the Tellico Dam because completion of the project would result in the extinction
of the native snail darter. Id. at 161-62. Though the Court disposed of this issue
under § 7 of ESA, which prohibits modification of the critical habitat of an endan-
gered species by a federal agency, the decision also briefly mentioned the § 9 tak-
ing implications of such significant habitat modifications. Id. at 184-85 n.30. The
Court, in granting the injunction, noted that the goal of ESA was to "halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." Id. at 184.
20. See California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1388 (D.C. Cal. 1981) (holding
that oil leases did not constitute § 9 takings because there was no immediate threat
to endangered species), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 312 (1984); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F.
Supp. 332, 362 (D.D.C. 1979) (denying injunction to stop oil leases because there
was no imminent danger to whales, and possibility of future action did not amount
to taking under ESA), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 690 (D.P.R. 1979) (denying injunction to stop
Navy exercises because of failure to show adverse effects upon species), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981).
21. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
1996]
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modification constituted a taking even absent a showing of popula-
tion decline among the endangered species.2 2 In response to Palila
I, USFWS amended its definition of "harm" to include only those
instances in which the habitat modification actually killed or in-
jured the endangered species.2 3 Despite this alleged clarification, 24
the confusion over what types of significant habitat modification
amounted to section 9 takings continued.2 5
In 1982, Congress amended ESA by implementing a permit sys-
tem for incidental takings resulting from habitat modification.2 6
This narrow exception to the taking prohibition increased the flexi-
bility of ESA and reduced section 9 liability.2 7 As a result, courts
began to liberalize their interpretation of habitat modification pro-
hibited under section 9, including activities that only indirectly
killed members of the species. 28
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit revisited the issue of section 9
takings in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources
(Palila I1).29 In Palila II, the court held that an ESA taking included
any significant habitat modification that may cause injury to an en-
dangered species in the future. Reaching this conclusion, the court
noted that the "harm" to the protected species did not have to be
22. Palila L 471 F. Supp. at 995. In Palila I, the plaintiffs sought the removal
of feral sheep and goats from the critical habitat of the endangered palila bird. Id.
at 990. The keeping of sheep and goats, which ate the mamane and naio trees
upon which the palla were dependent, in the palila's critical habitat constituted a
taking under § 9. Id. at 995.
23. For the USFWS definition of "harm," see supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
24. The new definition of "harm" with respect to habitat modification, requir-
ing actual death or injury to the protected species, is still ambiguous because
USFWS does not clearly define "injury." See Cheever, supra note 3, at 148 n.233.
25. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 389
(D. Wyo. 1987) (holding that operation of campground and fishing bridge at na-
tional park did not sufficiently modify habitat of grizzly bears to constitute takings
under ESA); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish
Comm'n, 550 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that activities of local
deer hunt did not amount to § 9 takings).
26. ESA § 10(a) (1) (B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1) (B). This provision authorizes
USFWS to issue permits for takings that are incidental to an otherwise lawful activ-
ity. Id.
27. Under § 9, the taking of any endangered species of fish or wildlife is pro-
hibited. ESA § 9(a) (1) (B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B). The 1982 amendment to
ESA, however, provides an escape from this widesweeping liability. ESA
§ 10(a) (1) (B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
28. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1089, 1092
(E.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that authorization of lead-shot hunting constituted tak-
ing of bald eagles though protected species were only indirectly endangered by
activity).
29. 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
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imminent.30 A majority of courts that have interpreted section 9
have followed and expanded the Palila II decision.31 Other courts,
however, while consistently holding that some types of habitat mod-
ification may be significant enough to constitute a taking, were not
yet ready to adopt the expansive position advanced by the court in
Palila JJ32
B. Methods of Statutory Interpretation
A court has many tools at its disposal for interpreting a statu-
tory term.3 3 One common method of statutory construction is the
principle noscitur a sociis. This doctrine maintains that a word gath-
ers its meaning from its context, established by the surrounding
words.3 4 Many courts use this approach to determine the meaning
of ambiguous statutory terms.3 5 If necessary, a court may also re-
view the legislative history of the statute to determine the meaning
30. Palla II, 649 F. Supp. at 1080.
31. See American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating
that § 9 liability results from significant habitat modifications that cause actual in-
jury to endangered species); Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 438 (5th Cir.
1991) (holding that Forest Service's timber management program constituted ESA
taking because it significantly altered feeding patterns); Defenders of Wildlife v.
EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that registration of pesticides,
although only indirect harm to endangered species, amounted to taking); United
States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal.
1992) (holding that placement of irrigation screen constituted a taking under § 9
even though it only indirectly caused harm to wildlife).
32. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N.R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1512-13
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that habitat modification must be direct and significant to
constitute "harm" under § 9); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United
States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that irrigation
did not amount to significant habitat modification under ESA even though it low-
ered water levels in area); Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424, 430 (S.D. Ala.
1992) (holding that habitat modification alone does not constitute "harm" under
ESA, and requiring "critical link" between modification and injury to species
under § 9); Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 939 (D. Mont.
1992) (stating that § 9 liability is limited to substantial habitat modifications that
cause direct and actual injury to proteced species).
33. For a further discussion of the primary methods of statutory construction
used in Sweet Home IV, see infra notes 67-71, 77-80, 93-98 and accompanying text.
34. Literally, noscitur a sociis means "it is known from its associates." BLACK's
LAw DICTIONARY 956 (6th ed. 1990). "Under the doctrine of 'noscitur a sociis,' the
meaning of questionable words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by refer-
ence to the meaning of words or phrases associated with it." Id. For a further
discussion of the Court's use of the noscitur a sociis principle in Sweet Home IV, see
infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
35. See Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (using nos-
citur a sociis to determine meaning of "reporting and recordkeeping"); Third Nat'l
Bank v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977) (holding that words that are
grouped together have related meaning); Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S.
303, 307 (1961) (stating that ambiguous word gathers meaning from words around
it); United States v. Hayashi, 5 F.3d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that harass-
1996] 485
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of a particular term.3 6
Another tool of statutory construction employed by courts is
the ratification principle. This method asserts that, by amending or
reenacting a statutory provision, Congress impliedly ratifies not
only adjacent clauses but also any regulations promulgated with re-
spect to these provisions.3 7 Alternatively, a court may simply look to
the plain meaning of the word.38
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,39
provides guidance to courts forced to engage in statutory interpre-
tation. When a reviewing court interprets statutory provisions, it
ment, in context with taking provision of Marine Mammal Protection Act, must
involve direct action by perpetrator).
36. For a further discussion of the use of legislative history by the Sweet Home
/V Court, see infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. See generally Ratzlaf v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 662 (1994) (stating that reference to legislative intent
is unnecessary if statutory language is clear); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398
(1992) (holding that court should resort to legislative history only if there are statu-
tory ambiguities).
37. See generally John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank,
114 S. Ct. 517, 526 (1993) (stating that court is constrained only by actual words of
statute); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 840
(1988) (holding that assumptions of subsequent Congress as to legislative meaning
are irrelevant, and that enacting Congress's intent governs interpretation
problems); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 237 (1987)
(stating that amendment does not alter existing statute); BobJones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983) (holding that congressional inaction is not always
valid interpretation guide); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 152, 193
(1978) (stating that committees' understanding of amendment is not law); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 (1977) (holding that
intent of enacting Congress governs); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69
(1946) (noting that congressional silence does not mean approval); Ohio v. United
States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that con-
gressional inaction does not infer ratification). But seeJohnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) (holding that congressional silence does have
probative value in statutory construction); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986) (stating that failure to modify administrative inter-
pretation by Congress is evidence of approval); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel
Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985) (noting congressional presumption of
knowledge of administrative interpretation when it reenacts legislation); United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 137 (1985) (holding that
refusal to override agency interpretation is evidence of congressional approval);
United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 134 (1978) (stating that reenact-
ment of legislation is equivalent of adoption of agency interpretation); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975) (noting that in reenacting legisla-
tion, Congress is presumed to have knowledge of judicial interpretation); Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921) (holding that individual
views of legislators are not necessarily valid indicators of true legislative intent).
38. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 431 (1987) (holding that plain meaning of words is important tool of statutory
construction which is "not to be lightly discounted").
39. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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must give effect to the clear and unambiguous intent of Congress.40
If congressional intent is unclear, the court must examine the ad-
ministrative agency's interpretation of the statutory language. 41
Under this standard of review, the court must defer to the agency
interpretation if it is a permissible construction of the statutory
terms.42 The Chevron court further cautioned against substitution
of judicial interpretation of a statute when a reasonable agency in-
terpretation exists.43
A court should not, therefore, casually dismiss agency authority
and discretion to promulgate regulations.44 In using these various
methods of construction, courts must strike a balance among legis-
lative intent, agency discretion, and judicial activism.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Lujan
(Sweet Home 1), groups dependent on the timber industry brought a
declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Interior and
the Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS). 45 The plaintiffs included landowners, logging compa-
nies, families, and lumber trade associations dependent on the for-
est products industry in the Pacific Northwest and Southeast.46
These groups challenged the validity of the USFWS regulation de-
fining "harm" as significant habitat modification and degrada-
tion.47 The plaintiffs also asserted that USFWS restrictions on
timber harvesting, implemented to prevent takings of the red-cock-
aded woodpecker, an endangered species,48 and the northern spot-
40. Id. at 842-43.
41. Id. at 843.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 844. In Cheuron, the Court held that judicial interpretation of a
statute is appropriate only where there is no clear legislative intent or administra-
tive construction. Id. at 843.
44. The Court held that agency regulations should be given deference unless
they are "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron, 467
U.S. at 844.
45. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Lujan (Sweet
Home 1), 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt (Sweet Home I/), 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part (Sweet Home II), 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
rev'd (Sweet Home 11), 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
46. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 282.
47. Id. For the USFWS definition of "harm," see supra note 10 and accompa-
nying text.
48. ESA defines "endangered species" as:
any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a signifi-
1996] 487
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ted owl, a threatened species, 49 caused them great economic loss. 5 0
These groups argued that Congress did not intend the section
9 taking prohibition to include habitat modification and degrada-
tion, and claimed that the USFWS regulation defining "harm" as
habitat modification was therefore invalid under ESA.51 The plain-
tiffs advanced three arguments in support of their claim. First, that
the Senate deleted habitat modification from the definition of a
taking in the original version of ESA.52 Second, Congress intended
the ESA provision authorizing the federal government to purchase
private property as the exclusive method to prevent habitat modifi-
cation on private land.53 Third, the addition of "harm" to ESA's
definition of "take" should not be expanded to include habitat
modification because the definition was amended without full Sen-
ate debate.54
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
rejected the plaintiffs' arguments and upheld the validity of the
USFWS regulation. 55 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit initially affirmed the district court's
judgment.56 Upon rehearing, however, the court of appeals re-
cant portion of its range other than a species of the Class Insecta deter-
mined by the Secretary [of the Interior] to constitute a pest whose
protection under the provisions of this chapter would present an over-
whelming and overriding risk to man.
ESA § 3(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
49. ESA defines "threatened species" as "any species which is likely to become
an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant
portion of its range." ESA § 3(20), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
50. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 282. These groups claimed that they suffered
economic losses as a result of limitations on income from land, employee layoffs,
and a reduction in the timber supply. Id.
51. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2410.
52. Id. The original Senate draft of ESA included "destruction, modification
or curtailment of [the] habitat or range" of fish or wildlife in the definition of
"take." Id. at 2411-12 (quoting S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973)). This lan-
guage, however, was deleted from the Senate bill before enactment. Id. at 2411.
53. Id. ESA permits the federal government to purchase private land to pre-
vent the modification or degradation of the habitat of an endangered or
threatened species. ESA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1534.
54. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2411. The Senate added "harm" to the defini-
tion of "take" in ESA in a floor amendment without debate. Id.
55. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 285. The district court evaluated the defini-
tion of "harm" in light of legislative intent, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Palila I,
the ratification principle, and the incidental taking permit amendment to ESA. Id.
at 284-85. The court concluded that the USFWS regulation was a reasonable inter-
pretation of ESA under the standard of review mandated by Chevron, and therefore
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. Id. For a further discussion of the Chevron
standard of review, see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
56. Sweet Home 1, 1 F.3d at 1.
8
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versed its prior decision. 57 In this rehearing, the court of appeals
held that the USFWS definition of "harm" was unreasonable in
light of legislative intent and was, therefore, invalid.58 Petition for a
second rehearing was subsequently denied.59 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, and
held that the USFWS regulation was a reasonable interpretation of
ESA. 60 The United States Supreme Court's ultimate resolution of
whether habitat modification constitutes an ESA taking is the focus
of this Note.
IV. NARRATIvE ANALYSIS
A. USFWS Definition of Harm Held Valid Under ESA
The Court began its analysis of ESA with a brief explanation of
the general structure of this complex legislation. 61 Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority of the Court, emphasized that the primary
purpose of ESA is to protect and save endangered and threatened
species from extinction. 62 The Court also summarized the argu-
ments advanced in this appeal. 63 The petitioners, the Secretary of
57. Sweet Home II, 17 F.3d at 1472. On rehearing, the court of appeals re-
versed its initial judgment, and held that the USFWS regulation defining habitat
modification as "harm" was an unreasonable and, therefore, invalid interpretation
of ESA. Id.
58. Id. The court based its holding on the noscitur a sociis principle, the nar-
row definition of "harassment" in the taking provision of the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act addressed in Hayashi the legislative history of ESA, the incidental
taking permit amendment, and the general structure and purpose of ESA. Id.
The court of appeals held that "harm," prohibited by the § 9 taking provision,
included only direct applications of force by a perpetrator against a member of a
protected species. Id. at 1465. This holding created a circuit split in light of the
Ninth Circuit's expansive Palila UI decision.
59. Sweet Home, 30 F.3d at 190.
60. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2418. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opin-
ion of the Court, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. Id. at 2409.
61. Id. at 2409-10. Justice Stevens briefly outlined relevant provisions and the
general structure of ESA, including: (1) the definition of "take" (§ 3); (2) the
authority of the Secretary of the Interior to list endangered and threatened spe-
cies, and to promulgate regulations in furtherance of ESA (§ 4); (3) the fed-
eral land acquisition program (§ 5); (4) the prohibition of critical habitat mod-
ification or degradation applicable to federal agencies (§ 7); (5) the general taking
prohibition (§ 9); and (6) the incidental taking permit amendment (§ 10). Id.
For a further discussion of these ESA provisions, see supra notes 4-8 and accompa-
nying text. The Court also set forth the USFWS definition of "harm." Id. at 2410.
For the text of this definition, see supra note 10.
62. Sweet Home I, 115 S. Ct. at 2409.
63. Id. at 2412. The Court made the following factual assumptions: (1) the
respondents did not purposely intend to harm any native endangered or
threatened species, but simply wanted to conduct otherwise lawful logging activi-
ties in the area; (2) the respondents' actions would detrimentally affect the natural
1996]
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the Interior and the Director of USFWS, maintained that the sec-
tion 9 taking prohibition prevented any habitat modification by the
respondents that would injure or kill endangered native birds, un-
less these groups first obtained an incidental taking permit under
ESA.64 The respondents, groups dependent on the timber indus-
try, contended that the federal government's only means under
ESA to prevent habitat modification on private land is to purchase
the property.65
Ultimately, the majority rejected the respondents' argument,
and held that the USFWS definition of "harm" was a valid interpre-
tation of the statutory language of ESA. 66 The Court, however, first
reviewed the plain meaning of the term "harm,"67 and concluded
that its definition obviously encompassed habitat modification that
actually injured or killed endangered or threatened species. 68 Fur-
thermore, the Court rejected the respondents' claim that "harm"
included only direct applications of force against a protected spe-
cies. 69 Justice Stevens noted the significance of Congress's deliber-
ate selection and placement of "harm" in the definition of "take,"70
habitat of the red-cockaded woodpecker and the northern spotted owl and; (3) as
a result of this habitat modification and degradation, members of the protected
species would be injured or killed. Id. Justice Stevens also noted that pursuant to
16 U.S.C. §§ 1540(a) (1),(b) (1), only a "knowing violation" of the statute or one of
its implementing regulations results in criminal or serious civil liability under ESA.
Id. at 2412 n.9. The Court additionally stated that ESA liability provisions implic-
itly incorporate the ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeabil-
ity, thereby eliminating § 9 liability where causation is speculative or remote. Id.
64. Id. at 2412.
65. Id.
66. Id. "Harm" was defined by USFWS as habitat modification.
67. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2412. The dictionary definition of "harm" is
"to cause hurt or damage to; injure." Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIpD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICrIONARY 1034 (1966)).
68. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2412-13.
69. Id. at 2413. Justice Stevens noted that the dictionary definition does not
limit "harm" to only direct or willful actions that result in injury. Id. The respon-
dents argued that a wildlife taking includes only "efforts to exercise dominion over
some creature." Id. at 2413 n.10. Additionally, the Court rejected respondents in-
terpretation of "take," and stressed that the definition of this term was not an issue
in Sweet Home /Vbecause Congress explicitly defined "take" in ESA. Id. The scope
of review was therefore limited to determining the reasonableness of the definition
of "harm" under the USFWS regulation. Id.
70. Id. The Court reasoned that if "harm" did not include indirect as well as
direct means of killing and injuring protected species, it would have no independ-
ent meaning within ESA's definition of "take." Id. at 2413 n.11. The Court noted
that the other terms listed in the definition of "take," "harass," "pursue," "hunt,"
"shoot," "wound," "kill," "trap," "capture," and "collect," generally refer to direct
and intentional actions. Id. "Harm," reasonably interpreted to include indirect
actions such as habitat modification, does not therefore simply duplicate, but in-
stead supplements, these other terms. Id. Justice Stevens added that any overlap
in the meanings of the statutory terms reflects the broad purpose of ESA. Id.
10
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and stressed the Court's reluctance to treat statutory language as
surplusage. 71
The Court also emphasized the broad purposes of ESA: (1) to
conserve the ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened
species depend; 72 (2) to prevent and reverse the trend toward spe-
cies extinction; 73 and (3) to provide comprehensive protection for
endangered and threatened species. 74 The majority further noted
ESA's extensive application to both public and private actors on all
land and territorial seas of the United States. 75 In light of the gen-
eral goals and broad scope of ESA, the Court concluded that the
USFWS interpretation of "harm" as habitat modification was
justified.76
Justice Stevens offered ESA's incidental taking permit provi-
sion as additional support for the regulation's validity. 77 The 1982
ESA amendment authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue
permits for takings, incidental to a lawful activity, that would other-
wise be prohibited under section 9.78 The Court reasoned that
Congress, by implementing this incidental taking permit system,
contemplated indirect takings. 79 Incidental activities such as
71. Id. at 2413. The Court cited Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv.,
Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988), to support this proposition. Id. For a further discussion
of Mackey, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
72. Sweet Home 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2413. Section 2(b) states that the general
purpose of ESA is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endan-
gered species and threatened species depend may be conserved .. " ESA § 2(b),
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
73. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2413. The Court stressed the significance of its
holding in Tennessee Vallty Auth. v. Hill that congressional intent in enacting ESA
was "to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." Id.
(quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)). Justice Stevens
also noted the Court's acceptance of the inclusion of habitat modification in the
USFWS definition of "harm" in HilL Id. at 2413-14. For a further discussion of
HiU, see supra notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text.
74. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
75. Id. at 2413.
76. Id. at 2414. The respondents challenged the statutory validity of the
"harm" regulation on its face and, therefore, requested that the Court invalidate
USFWS's definition of "harm" even in cases where an actor intentionally and
knowingly destroys the habitat of an endangered or threatened species. Id. The
Court reiterated its conclusion that the ordinary requirements of proximate causa-
tion and foreseeability apply to the § 9 taking provision. Id. at 2414 n.13. Justice
Stevens also noted that USFWS's use of the word "actually" in the definition of
"harm" further limits § 9 liability. Id.
77. Id. at 2414.
78. ESA § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
79. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2414. The Court concluded that Congress
intended to reach indirect and unintentional takings through the § 10 permit pro-
cess because an actor who plans deliberate, direct action against a protected spe-
cies will not apply for an incidental taking permit. Id. Congress, therefore,
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habitat modification, not intended to injure or kill an endangered
species, may therefore constitute prohibited takings under section
9 unless the actor first obtains the requisite permit.80
B. Errors Committed by the Court of Appeals
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit had previously invalidated the USFWS regulation under
the noscitur a sociis method of statutory construction.81 The court of
appeals concluded that "harm," in light of the other terms listed in
the definition of "take,"8 2 referred only to direct applications of
force against a protected species. 83 In Sweet Home IV, the Supreme
Court rejected this approach and noted that the definition of "take"
includes other actions that do not require direct force by the
actor.8 4 The majority analyzed the independent meaning and func-
tion of "harm" in the definition of "take," and emphasized Con-
gress's deliberate selection of this term. 5
The court of appeals had also reasoned that the USFWS regula-
tion undermined the federal government's incentive to purchase
private land to prevent takings since it could simply prohibit takings
under section 9.86 The Supreme Court rejected this assumption,
and noted circumstances in which the purchase of private land by
the federal government under section 5 could still be desirable.87
understood § 9 to prohibit both indirect and deliberate takings when it enacted
the 1982 amendment. Id.
80. Id.
81. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1465-66. For a further discussion of the noscitur
a sociis principle, see supra notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text.
82. For ESA's definition of "take," see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
83. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1465-66.
84. Id. at 2414-15. Some of the terms listed in the definition of "take" that do
not specifically refer to direct applications of force include "harass," "pursue,"
"wound," and "kill." Id. The Court noted that deliberate, direct action is not re-
quired for ESA liability. Id. Justice Stevens also criticized the court of appeals'
reliance on United States v. Hayashi because the definition of "take" in the Marine
Mammal Protection Act addressed by the Ninth Circuit in that case did not in-
clude "harm" and required a direct intrusion on wildlife. Id. at 2415 n.16. For a
further discussion of Hayashi, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
85. Sweet Home IV 115 S. Ct. at 2415. The court of appeals erred by giving
"harm" the exact same meaning as the other terms listed in the "take" definition,
despite contrary congressional intent. Id. Justice Stevens emphasized that Con-
gress intended the word "harm" to retain a meaning that is consistent with, but
distinct from, the other statutory terms. Id.
86. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1466. See ESA § 5, 16 U.S.C. § 1534.
87. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2415. The Court listed three situations in
which the federal government may elect to purchase private lands under § 5 in-
stead of prosecuting the actor under § 9: (1) purchasing private lands may be less
expensive than pursuing civil or criminal liability; (2) the federal government can
prevent habitat destruction under § 5; however, § 9 cannot be enforced until a
12
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Justice Stevens also emphasized the distinction between the general
prohibition of takings by any person in section 9 and section 7's
directive to federal agencies to avoid the destruction or modifica-
tion of a critical habitat.88
C. The Standard of Review
In Sweet Home IV, the Court also indicated that the USFWS reg-
ulation was a reasonable and permissible interpretation of ESA
under the Chevron analysis. 89 ESA's broad delegation of administra-
tive and interpretive authority to the Secretary of the Interior,90 as
well as the Secretary's degree of regulatory expertise, 91 justified the
Court's deference to the USFWS definition of "harm."92 The Court
also supported its conclusion with the legislative history of ESA. 93
Senate and House Committee Reports suggest that Congress in-
tended an expansive definition of "take" that included both direct
and indirect actions. 94 ESA's legislative history also reveals a Senate
bill amendment that added the term "harm" to the taking
protected species is actually injured or killed; and (3) § 5 allows the federal gov-
ernment to protect private lands that may become habitats to endangered or
threatened species in the future. Id.
88. Id. Section 7 creates an affirmative duty to avoid adverse habitat modifica-
tions. ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536. This section applies only to the federal govern-
ment, and is not limited to those modifications that actually injure or kill a
threatened or endangered species. Id. Section 7 liability is limited to, however,
only those actions that are likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any pro-
tected species and modification of a "critical habitat." Id. Section 9 prohibits
habitat modifications that actually injure or kill a protected species. ESA § 9, 16
U.S.C. § 1538. This provision extends liability to any person. Id. Justice Stevens
noted that any overlap between §§ 7 and 9 provides further proof of ESA's broad
purpose. Sweet Home 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2415-16.
89. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2416. For a further discussion of the Chevron
analysis, see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
90. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2418. Section 4 authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to define and list threatened and endangered species. ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533. Section 10 permits the Secretary of the Interior to establish standards for
the issuance of incidental taking permits. ESA § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
91. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2416. The Court determined that the defini-
tion and listing of protected species by the Secretary of the Interior requires a
great deal of expertise and discretion. Id. at 2418.
92. Id. at 2416.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Senate Report stated that" '[tiake' is defined.., in the broadest
possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can 'take' or
attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1973)). The House Report stated that: (1) prohibitions on takings were
defined in the "broadest possible terms;" (2) the taking provision included "harass-
ment, whether intentional or not;" and (3) activities of birdwatchers that indirectly
disturb the birds may result in § 9 liability. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973)).
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provision.9 5
The Court, however, disregarded the deletion of "habitat mod-
ification" from the definition of "take" in the original version of
ESA. 96 The majority instead focused upon the legislative history of
the incidental taking permit amendment as proof of congressional
intent to prohibit both indirect and direct takings. 97 Based on
ESA's text, general structure, legislative history, and broad delega-
tion of authority to the Secretary of the Interior, the Court upheld
the Secretary's definition of "harm" as a reasonable and valid inter-
pretation of ESA.98
D. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice O'Connor filed a brief concurring opinion in Sweet
Home I/99 The concurrence was conditioned on two premises.
First, the USFWS regulation is restricted to significant habitat modi-
fications that cause actual injury or death to protected species.100
Second, the regulation's application is confined to foreseeable tak-
ings.101 Justice O'Connor further limited the USFWS regulation to
95. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2416-17. Though neither of the two original
Senate bills, S. 1592 and S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), included "harm," this
term was subsequently added to the definition of "take" by Senator Tunney in a
floor amendment. Id. This amendment was added "to achieve the purposes of the
bill." Id. at 2417. Justice Stevens also noted the breadth of the added term and the
significance of the amendment process. Id.
96. Id. The original Senate draft included "the destruction, modification or
curtailment of [the] habitat or range of fish or wildlife" in the definition of "take."
S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 27 (1973). The Commerce Committee, however,
removed this language from the bill before it went to the Senate floor. Sweet Home
IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2417. The majority disregarded this deletion because: (1) ESA's
legislative history does not indicate why the habitat modification language was de-
leted; (2) the original definition of "take" was much too broad because § 9 liability
would not be limited to habitat modifications that actually injured or killed the
species; and (3) the provision did not limit liability to significant habitat modifica-
tions. Id.
97. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2417. The House Report provides that "[bly
use of the word 'incidental,' the Committee intends to cover situations in which it
is known that a taking will occur if the other activity is engaged in, but such taking
is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the activity." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No.
567, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1982)). The Court concluded, based on the legisla-
tive history of this amendment, that Congress enacted the incidental taking permit
system with takings resulting from habitat modification specifically in mind. Sweet
Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2418.
98. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2418.
99. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Id.
101. Id. Justice O'Connor stressed that the regulation's application must be
limited by the ordinary principles of proximate causation. Id. The concurrence
also questioned the validity of Palila i in light of these limitations. Id. For a fur-
ther discussion of Palila II, see supra notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text.
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activities that actually injure or kill individual animals, as opposed
to future populations of the protected species.' 02 The concur-
rence, however, stipulated that impairment of an animal's ability to
breed, or interference with the breeding process, may constitute
injury to the animal prohibited by section 9.103 Justice O'Connor
also addressed causation and section 9 liability.10 4 Although ESA
does not expressly state the degree of causation required for taking
liability, Justice O'Connor concluded that ESA impliedly invokes
the ordinary principles of proximate causation.' 0 5 Only habitat
modifications that cause foreseeable injury or death to an identifi-
able protected species, therefore, result in ESA liability. 0 6
Justice Scalia filed a lengthy dissent in Sweet Home IV 07 First,
the dissent recognized the economic injustice that would result
from the inclusion of habitat modification in the definition of
"harm." s08 Justice Scalia also discussed three fundamental flaws in
the USFWS regulation. First, even unintended and unforeseeable
takings would result in section 9 liability.' 0 9 Second, taking liability
can stem from either an act or omission."10 Third, the definition of
"harm" encompasses injury inflicted upon entire populations of en-
102. Sweet Home IV 115 S. Ct. at 2418 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 2419. Justice O'Connor emphasized that significant interference
with breeding actually injures the individual living creature by impairing "its most
essential physical functions and to render that animal, and its genetic material,
biologically obsolete." Id. The concurrence also noted that impairment of repro-
duction resulting from habitat modification can cause actual injury to the individ-
ual animal by restricting its ability to flee or protect itself and causing physical
complications during gestation. Id. According to Justice O'Connor, the USFWS
regulation, which requires actual injury or death of a protected species, does not
extend taking liability to hypothetical, nonexistent animals. Id.
104. Id. at 2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. Id. Justice O'Connor reasoned that use of the word "actually" in the
USFWS regulation invokes a proximate causation requirement, and therefore pre-
vents § 9 liability for remote or speculative consequences that result from the
habitat modification. Id.
106. Id.
107. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Id.
108. Id. Justice Scalia argued that the majority's holding was fundamentally
unfair and would ultimately result in financial ruin for those who merely wished to
develop their private property. Id. Justice Scalia noted the two primary goals of
ESA: (1) to prevent the hunting and killing of protected species; and (2) to pre-
serve the habitat of endangered and threatened species through the acquisition of
private property by the federal government. Id.
109. Id. Justice Scalia argued that under the majority's interpretation of § 9,
any habitat modification that in fact causes death or injury to protected wildlife
results in ESA liability, even if the link between the modification and the death or
injury is remote and speculative. Id. at 2421.
110. Id. at 2422. The current version of the USFWS regulation defining
"harm," adopted in 1981, deletes the term "omission." Id. USFWS states, however,
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dangered and threatened species."' The dissent emphasized that
ESA did not authorize these three aspects of the regulation. 112
Justice Scalia also examined the various definitions of "take"
used in wildlife legislation and treaties.' 13 The dissent stressed that
the generally accepted statutory and common law meaning of a
wildlife "taking" includes only direct and intentional acts against
particular animals. 114 He further noted that the section 9 taking
prohibition regulates "all the stages of the process by which pro-
tected wildlife is reduced to man's dominion and made the object
of profit."1 15 The dissent also evaluated the plain meaning of
"harm,"1 6 and stressed that all of the other terms in the definition
of "take" describe affirmative conduct intentionally directed at a
particular protected animal.' 17 Justice Scalia also illustrated some
that the term "act" is "inclusive of either commissions or omissions which would be
prohibited by § 1538(a) (1) (B)." Id. (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 54748, 54750 (1981)).
111. Id. The dissent noted that the definition of "harm" promulgated by
USFWS includes acts which "significantly impair essential behavioral patterns, in-
cluding breeding." Id. The term "harm" is thus not limited to the direct injury or
death of an individual member of a protected species, but is expanded to preserve
the entire population of animals. Id.
112. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. Justice Scalia noted the following common definitions of "take" used
in reference to wild animals: (1) "to reduce those animals, by killing or capturing,
to human control;" (2) "to catch, capture (a wild beast, bird, fish, etc.);" (3) "to
catch or capture by trapping, snaring, etc., or as prey;" (4) "[A]I the animals which
can be taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air, that is to say, wild animals,
belong to those who take them;" (5) "Every man.., has an equal right of pursuing
and taking to his own use all such creatures as are ferae naturae;" (6) "pursue,
hunt, take, capture, kill, [or] attempt to take, capture, or kill;" and (7) "hunting,
killing, and capturing." Id. at 2422-23.
114. Id. at 2423. Justice Scalia emphasized that the common law definition of
"take" did not include omissions or indirect or accidental acts directed at a popula-
tion of protected animals. Id.
115. Id. at 2422. The dissent argued that the common meaning of "take" is
consistent with the other provisions of § 9, which make it unlawful to: (1) import
or export a protected species; (2) possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship a
taken species; and (3) transport, sell, or offer to sell a protected species in inter-
state or foreign commerce. Id. Justice Scalia noted that ESA's definition of "take"
is expansive because it includes the entire process of "taking" and attempts to
"take." Id. at 2423.
116. Id. Justice Scalia listed the following common definitions of "harm:" (1)
"to cause injury;" (2) "to do hurt or damage;" (3) "to hurt; to injure; to damage; to
impair soundness of body, either animal or vegetable;" (4) "injury; damage; hurt;
to do him bodily harm;" (5) specially focused hurt or injury, as if a personal injury
has been anticipated and intended;" and (6) physical or mental distress to living
things." Id. The dissent emphasized that habitat modification is inconsistent with
the plain and common meaning of the term "harm" because it is an unintentional
act that only indirectly causes injury or death upon a population of animals. Id.
Justice Scalia further noted that it is unlikely that "Congress has defined a term in
a manner repugnant to its ordinary and traditional sense." Id.
117. Sweet Home lV, 115 S. Ct. at 2423-24. Justice Scalia stressed that all of the
16
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of the inconsistencies between an expansive definition of "harm"
and the general structure of ESA, including: (1) the penalty provi-
sions of ESA; 118 (2) use of "take" in other ESA provisions; 119 and
(3) the habitat modification prohibition in section 7 as applicable
to federal agencies.120
The majority's interpretation of the legislative history of ESA
was another point of contention for the dissent.1 21 First, the dissent
other terms listed in the definition of "take" are consistent with the plain meaning
of the word. Id. at 2423. For ESA's definition of "take," see supra note 7 and
accompanying text. The dissent offered a legal opinion of the Solicitor of USFWS
to support the common meaning of "take." Sweet Home 1V, 115 S. Ct. at 2424. The
Solicitor opined that ESA's "definition of 'take' contains a list of actions that illus-
trate the intended scope of the term.... Under the principle of statutory con-
struction, ejusdem generis .... the term 'harm' should be interpreted to include
only those actions that are directed against, and likely to injure or kill, individual
wildlife." Id. (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 29490, 29491 (1981)). Justice Scalia equated
this approach to the noscitur a sociis method of statutory construction, and con-
cluded that "harm" should be read in a manner that is consistent with the other
terms in the definition of "take." Id. Justice Scalia also rejected the majority's
contention that a narrow interpretation of "harm" added nothing to the definition
of "take." Id.
118. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Under ESA, an
actor who knowingly violates the taking provision is subject to both criminal and
civil penalties. Id. An actor "who otherwise violates" § 9 is subject only to a civil
penalty of $500. Id. Justice Scalia argued that an expansive interpretation of
"harm" is inconsistent with the penalty provisions of ESA because an actor may be
subject to strict criminal and civil liability under § 9 for any habitat modifications
that result in the indirect injury or death of a protected species even where the
taking is unforeseeable and accidental. Id.
119. Id. at 2425. The dissent emphasized that USFWS's broad definition of
"harm" is inconsistent with the use of "take" throughout ESA. Id. Justice Scalia
noted the following examples from ESA in which the traditional meaning of "take"
is employed: (1) "forfeiture of all guns, traps, nets, and other equipment... used
to aid the taking, possessing, selling .... of protected animals;" (2) takings by
Alaskan Indians and Eskimos are exempt "if such taking is primarily for subsis-
tence purposes .... non-edible byproducts of species taken pursuant to this section
may be sold.., when made into authentic native articles of handicrafts and cloth-
ing;" and (3) prohibition of the "possession, sale, and transport of species taken in
violation of the Act." Id.
120. Id. Section 7 prohibits the destruction or adverse modification of the
critical habitat of a threatened or endangered species by any federal agency. ESA
§ 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2). Justice Scalia argued that Congress's use of an express
prohibition against habitat modification in § 7 prevents an inference of an implicit
prohibition against habitat modification in § 9 because it is presumed that the
exclusion of similar statutory language by Congress was deliberate. Sweet Home IV,
115 S. Ct. at 2425. Justice Scalia further stressed that the federal government is
subject to both sections; therefore, an expansive definition of "harm" that in-
cludes habitat modification would be superfluous. Id. at 2426.
121. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2426-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
categorized the statements in the Committee Reports to the ESA which defined
" 'take' . . . in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in
which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife," as "empty flour-
ish." Id. at 2427.
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rejected the Court's theory that the expansive "harm" regulation
best served the purposes of ESA advanced by Congress.12 2 Second,
Justice Scalia criticized Justice Steven's emphasis on the addition of
the term "harm" to ESA's definition of "take,"123 and disregard for
the removal of the "habitat modification" language from ESA. 124
Third, the dissent stressed the importance of statements made by
the Senate and House floor managers which clearly pronounced
that habitat preservation on private property was to be achieved
principally by section 5's federal land acquisition program.1 25
Fourth, Justice Scalia dismissed the significance of the incidental
taking permit amendment. 26 For the reasons stated above, Justice
Scalia found the USFWS "harm" regulation to be an unreasonable
and impermissible interpretation of the definition of "take" under
122. Id. at 2426. Justice Scalia argued that Congress did not necessarily in-
tend for any regulatory interpretation that furthers the general purpose of a stat-
ute to be the law. Id. The dissent also rejected the majority's reliance on the
dictum contained in a footnote in Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill in which the Court
opined on the effect of the "harm" regulation in that case while assuming its valid-
ity. Id. at 2426 n.3. For a further discussion of HiU4 see supra notes 18, 19, 73 and
accompanying text.
123. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2427 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent ar-
gued that Justice Stevens inflated the significance of the Senate amendment that
added "harm" to the definition of "take" to "help achieve the purposes of the bill."
Id.
124. Id. Justice Scalia noted that the majority belittled the removal of "the
destruction, modification or curtailment of [the] habitat or range" of fish and
wildlife by Congress from the definition of "take" in the original version of ESA.
Id.
125. Id. During congressional debate over ESA, the Senate floor manager,
Senator Tunney, stated:
Through [the] land acquisition provisions, we will be able to conserve
habitats necessary to protect fish and wildlife from further destruc-
tion.... Although most endangered species are threatened primarily by
the destruction of their natural habitats, a significant portion of the ani-
mals are subject to predation by man for commercial, sport, consump-
tion, or other purposes....
Id. (quoting 119 CONG. REc. 25,669 (1973)). The House floor manager, Represen-
tative Sullivan, added, "[T] he principal threat to animals stems from destruction of
their habitat.... [The bill] will meet this problem by providing funds for acquisi-
tion of critical habitat .... Another hazard to endangered species arises from
those who would capture or kill them for pleasure or profit...." Id. (quoting 119
CONG. REC. 30,162 (1973)). Justice Scalia offered these statements as proof that:
(1) habitat modification and "takings" are two distinct problems under ESA and
(2) habitat preservation on private property is to be accomplished through the
federal land acquisition program. Id. at 2428.
126. Id. The dissent emphasized that the incidental taking permit amend-
ment does not necessarily infer prohibition of habitat modification under § 9 be-
cause there are numerous substantial "otherwise lawful activities" beside habitat
modification that might indirectly and accidentally result in a prohibited "taking."
Id.
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the Chevron standard of review. 127
V. CRITIcAL ANALYsis
A. Consistency with Section 9 Case Law
The United States Supreme Court's validation of the USFWS
"harm" regulation in Sweet Home IV is consistent with jurisdictional
trends. 128 Though the body of section 9 case law is small and incon-
sistent, most jurisdictions recognize that at least some forms of sig-
nificant habitat modification could be considered "harmful" to
threatened and endangered species, and are therefore prohibited
under ESA. 129 By its holding, the Court significantly strengthened
and expanded the proposition advanced in Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Hill,130 that the primary goal of ESA is to halt and reverse the
trend of species extinction at any cost.131
B. Methods of Statutory Interpretation
The Court's use of methods of statutory interpretation in Sweet
Home !Vwas appropriate. Justice Stevens examined the plain mean-
ing of "harm," correctly noting that application of the noscitur a
sociis principle13 2 to the terms used in the definition of "take" would
effectively nullify both the independent meaning and Congress's
deliberate selection of the words. 13 3 The Court's thorough evalua-
tion of the legislative history of ESA clearly indicated congressional
intent.13 4 Furthermore, the majority fully analyzed the structure
and general purposes of this sweeping and comprehensive wildlife
127. Id. at 2430.
128. For a further discussion of § 9 case law generally, see supra notes 16-32
and accompanying text.
129. For a list of cases in accord with the majority's approach in Sweet Home IV,
see supra notes 18, 19, 21, 22, 28-31 and accompanying text.
130. 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.30 (1978).
131. Id. The majority's holding also ratified the Ninth Circuit's controversial
Palila II decision. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila II),
649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). In Palila II,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the USFWS "harm" regulation. Id. at 1110. Sweet Home
IV, however, limited the application of Palila II to significant habitat modifications
that cause actual death to identifiable protected animals. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct.
at 2418 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a further discussion of Palita AI, see supra
notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text.
132. For an explanation of the noscitur a sociis principle, see supra notes 34 &
35 and accompanying text.
133. Sweet Home IV, 115 S. Ct. at 2412-13. For a further discussion of the
Court's rejection of the noscitur a sociis theory, see supra notes 67-71 and accompa-
nying text.
134. Id. at 2416. See supra notes 93-98 for a further discussion of the Court's
evaluation of the legislative history of ESA in Sweet Home IV
1996]
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legislation, appropriately affording threatened and endangered
species ultimate protection under ESA.
C. The Standard of Review
Justice Stevens also properly applied the standard of review
mandated by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.13 5 in Sweet Home IV Under Chevron, the reviewing court, when
interpreting statutory provisions, must give effect to the clear and
unambiguous intent of Congress.136 If congressional intent is un-
clear, the court must examine and defer to the agency interpreta-
tion if it is a reasonable and permissible construction of the
statutory language.13 7 Since congressional intent, evidenced by the
legislative history of ESA, is ambiguous,138 the Court appropriately
adopted a reasonable interpretation of section 9 promulgated
under USFWS's discretionary authority, thus satisfying the rigid
standard of review imposed by Chevron.
D. Propriety of Reversing the Court of Appeals
The United States Supreme Court correctly reversed the deci-
sion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in Sweet Home IIL 3 9 The court of appeals flatly
rejected the inclusion of habitat modification in the definition of
"harm."140 This extremely narrow interpretation of the section 9
taking provision was inconsistent with jurisdictional trends.1 41 The
District of Columbia Circuit's holding created a significant circuit
split on the important statutory question of ESA takings.' 42 The
135. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text
for a further discussion of the Chevron standard of review.
136. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
137. Id. In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court held that judicial inter-
pretation of a statute is appropriate only where there is no clear legislative intent
or administrative construction. Id. Agency regulations should be given deference
unless they are "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at
844.
138. For a discussion of the legislative history of ESA that supports validation
of the USFWS regulation, see supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. See supra
notes 121-126 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislative history that
negates the "harm" regulation.
139. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1472.
140. Id. at 1472. For a further discussion of the rationale of the court of ap-
peals, see supra notes 81-83, 86 and accompanying text.
141. For a further discussion of cases that have upheld the validity of the
USFWS "harm" regulation, see supra notes 18, 19, 21, 22, 28-31 and accompanying
text.
142. The invalidation of the USFWS regulation in Sweet Home HI by the court
of appeals created a split of authority on ESA liability because the decision directly
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court of appeals ignored virtually all section 9 case law in invalidat-
ing the USFWS "harm" regulation.' 43 The court, though acknowl-
edging that a decision upholding the validity of the regulation did
exist, failed to address the important and directly adverse Palla II
holding. 144
The District of Columbia Circuit had also abandoned the stan-
dard of review in Sweet Home III. Given the ambiguous legislative
history of ESA, the court of appeals had incorrectly rejected a rea-
sonable and permissible interpretation of section 9 promulgated by
USFWS.1 45 In so doing, the court ignored the rigid standard of re-
view imposed by Chevron.'46
The court of appeals had relied upon various methods of statu-
tory interpretation to reach its conclusion, particularly the strength
of the legislative history of ESA, 147 and judicial rejection of the rati-
fication principle. 148 The clarity of the legislative intent of ESA,
however, was somewhat misrepresented by the court. 49 The nearly
universal rejection of the ratification theory alleged by the court of
appeals was also misleading.1 50 In light of the equally convincing
support on both sides of the issues of legislative intent and the rati-
fication principle, the District of Columbia Circuit's reliance on
such methods, and complete disregard for section 9 case law, was
unjustified.
VI. THE IMPACT OF SF-E -/ HomE.I1V
The United States Supreme Court's validation of the USFWS
"harm" regulation resolved a circuit split created by Paila II and the
conflicted with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &
Natural Resources (Palila /-), 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d
1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
143. The court of appeals relied solely upon the various methods of statutory
construction to invalidate the "harm" regulation. Sweet Home II1, 17 F.3d at 1464-
72.
144. Id. at 1469. The court of appeals simply stated that the Ninth Circuit had
upheld the USFWS regulation. Id. The court, however, failed to state the signifi-
cance of the fact that its holding in Sweet Home II1 created a circuit split.
145. Id. at 1472.
146. For a further discussion of the Chevron standard of review, see supra notes
39-44 and accompanying text.
147. Sweet Home 11, 17 F.3d at 1466-67.
148. Id. at 1467-72.
149. For a discussion of legislative history in support of the USFWS regula,
tion, see supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. See supra notes 121-126 and
accompanying text for a discussion of legislative history that negates the "harm"
regulation.
150. For a general discussion of the ratification principle, see supra note 37
and accompanying text.
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District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Sweet Home IlI Prior to
this resolution, courts had little guidance in the complex and con-
troversial area of ESA takings. Courts now have a clear and concise
interpretation of the section 9 taking prohibition.
By adopting USFWS's interpretation of "harm," Sweet Home IV
also exemplifies the Supreme Court's willingness to defer to agency
expertise and ESA's broad delegation of authority to the Secretary
of the Interior. Validation of the "harm" regulation, therefore,
strengthened the discretion of federal agencies generally to pro-
mulgate regulations that represent a reasonable construction of the
statutory language.151
The decision in Sweet Home IValso confirmed many of the fears
and criticisms of ESA's sweeping potential for liability.152 In up-
holding the USFWS regulation, the Court accomplished the follow-
ing objectives: (1) increasing the strength of ESA; (2) promoting
the primary goals of ESA by affording threatened and endangered
species and their critical habitats the ultimate protection under the
law; and (3) extending section 9 taking liability. Though actors
may still obtain incidental taking permits under ESA, proponents of
development may argue that the broad definition of "harm" upheld
in Sweet Home IV will obstruct and discourage public and private
land use programs.153
151. See generally RobertJ. Gregory, When a Delegation is Not a Delegation: Using
Legislative Meaning to Define Statutory Gaps, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 725 (1990) (discuss-
ing legislative effect of agency rulemaking and analyzing Chevron standard).
152. ESA's broad scope has significantly restricted private land use and devel-
opment. Craig Anthony Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The
Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use Development, 10 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1991). Developers must expend time and money to implement im-
pact studies, devise alternative plans and apply for necessary permits to avoid § 9
liability. Id. at 4. ESA has particularly restricted the construction of low-income
housing and minority businesses because the compliance requirements are cost-
prohibitive to these groups. Id. at 34. A more realistic approach to the conserva-
tion problem would be to balance species preservation with social needs and the
benefits of development. Id. at 5.
153. It has been suggested that the expansive scope and power of ESA have
resulted in the preservation of endangered species at the expense of human jobs
and property rights. Stuart Hardy, The Endangered Species Act: On a Collision Course
with Human Needs, 13 PuB. LAND L. REv. 87 (1992). Some of the effects of ESA's
§ 9 taking prohibition include plummeting property values, the slowing of eco-
nomic and land development, and suspension of agricultural undertakings. Id. at
92. It has also been argued that though preservation of threatened and endan-
gered species and their habitats is necessary, it cannot be achieved at "any cost,"
because in the political arena, preservation will ultimately be weighed against eco-
nomic interests. Id. at 88. Specific concerns of the business community include:
(1) economic impacts must be sufficiently weighed in balancing economic inter-
ests and species protection; (2) compensation for prohibitions on private property;
(3) preemption of other state and federal land use statutes by ESA; and (4) abuse
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The controversy and significance of Sweet Home IV cannot be
overstated. The holding is particularly significant because it gives
courts clear guidance on the issue of section 9 takings. District
courts will no longer have the discretion to choose between the two
conflicting authorities in this area. The confusion over which land
uses result in section 9 liability is also resolved by the decision.' 54
This holding ultimately, and most significantly, strengthens the ESA
and increases its ability to protect and conserve our most precious
resources.
Shelli Lyn Iovino
of taxonomic classification by animal rights activists to preclude economic growth.
Id. at 90-91.
154. ESA offers the following alternatives to private landowners who are un-
certain about taking liability: (1) do not undertake any activity that may result in a
§ 9 taking; (2) apply for an incidental taking permit; or (3) seek guidance from
USFWS as to whether either the species or the activity involved will result in ESA
liability. Steven P. Quarles et al., The Unsettled Law of ESA Takings, 8 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T. 10,' 61 (1993).
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